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COMMENT
DISCOVERY AS ABUSE
FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK*

That discovery is war comes as no surprise. That discovery is nuclear war,
as John Setear suggests, is.' Discovery more often calls to mind the trench
warfare of World War I, the war of attrition. During World War I cooperative patterns evolved, as soldiers called time-out and even sang holiday
carols to the other side. 2 The cooperation broke down as fresh troops, or
worse, new officers, arrived on the scene and disregarded the established
patterns. Robert Axelrod views such patterns of cooperation and conflict as
logical outcomes of repeated plays of the game Prisoner's Dilemma. 3 John
Setear invites us to view discovery the same way and draws out the implications: the farther in the future the resolution of the case, the fewer "plays"
of the game per case, and the more atomistic the profession, the less
cooperation there will be. He recommends methods to increase the number
of interactions between members of the bar to augment the probability of
cooperation.
This is not a novel program. Gordon Tullock applied game theory to the
process of deciding how much to invest in litigation, the equivalent of
deciding whether to make costly discovery requests.4 Every student of the
subject owes a debt to Thomas Schelling, whose treatment of limited war
can be transferred to discovery.' Setear, however, deserves credit for translating a few of the essential ideas of game theory for a legal audience.
Unfortunately, the translation is labored, lengthy, and cute; headings such
6
as "We at Dewey, Screwham have a truly nationalpractice"?
draw yuks but
repel scholars; the difference in style between this paper and one that could
be published in The Journal of Conflict Resolution illustrates a reason
why many social scientists want to hold lawyers at arms' length.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago. Ithank Douglas G. Baird, Richard A. Epstein, Larry Kramer,
William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, Jack B. Weinstein, Samuel A. Wilkins, Diane
P. Wood, and Ari S. Zymelman for their helpful comments on an earlier version of
this essay.
I Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U.L. REV. 569 (1989).
2 J. ELLIS, EYE-DEEP IN HELL: TRENCH WARFARE IN WORLD WAR 1 170-73
(1976).
3 R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20, 54 (1984).
4 G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 49-69 (1980).
T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53-80, 119-61 (rev.
6

Setear, supra note 1, at 619.
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More surprising than Setear's analysis is Judge Weinstein's conclusion
that discovery abuse isn't worth worrying about. 7 The Harris Poll unveiled
at this conference shows that 33% of federal judges think that there are "a
lot" of problems in discovery; another 50% say there are "some" problems;
only 3% think there are "no" problems. 8 As 84% of federal judges have
imposed sanctions on improper motions or tactics, 9 and 84% think that the
bifurcation of trials is beneficial, 10 it is tempting to suppose that there is a
ready answer to the woes of discovery. Lawyers who engage in discovery
abuse should be bifurcated. Judge Weinstein, however, is in the 3%. One
day he polled the magistrates in the Eastern District of New York. These
magistrates are in charge of discovery in Judge Weinstein's bailiwick; the
judges of his court view managing discovery and resolving disputes about it
as beneath their station (more neutrally, they believe there are better uses of
their time). "Do you allow discovery abuse?" the judge asked; "No!" the
answer rang out. Well, there you have it. Nirvana has been located, and it is
in Brooklyn. I would be inclined to discount the word of magistrates whose
jobs would have been in jeopardy if they owned that they knew about and
tolerated abusive tactics in discovery. More, I doubt that magistrates could
recognize excessive discovery. Discovery presents intractable problems
because it may be tagged "excessive" only in retrospect, a subject to which
I return.

Setear, like most of us, sees discovery as both a tool for uncovering facts
essential to accurate adjudication and a weapon capable of imposing large
and unjustifiable costs on one's adversary. Litigants with weak cases have
little use for bringing the facts to light and every reason to heap costs on the
adverse party-on this supposition, the one in the right. The prospect of
these higher costs leads the other side to settle on favorable terms. All of the
models of settlement imply that parties divide between them the gains from
avoiding litigation." More discovery (better: the credible threat of more
Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse?: A Comment on John Setear's The Barrister
and The Bomb, 69 B.U.L. REv. 649, 653-54 (1989).
8 Louis Harris & Associates, Judges' Opinions on ProceduralIssues: A Survey of
State and FederalTrialJudges Who Spend at Least HalfTheir Time on General Civil

Cases, 69 B.U.L. REv. 731, 737 (Table 2.1) (1989) [hereinafter Judges' Opinions].
9 Available upon request from Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.
10Judges' Opinions, supra note 8, at 744 (Table 5.3).

11There are so many papers elaborating on the groundbreaking work of William
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61(1971), that it is
not worthwhile to catalog them. Most of the contributions since 1971 are collected in
Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A
Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J.

(1988), which adds insights.
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discovery) increases these "savings," which the parties share in a ratio
determined by their endurance, capacity to bluff, and so on-in other words,
by factors unrelated to their legal entitlements. The party in a position to
threaten exhaustive discovery can claim for itself in settlement a portion of
the costs that should not have been imposed in the first place. Sometimes
threats must be carried out; as in war, both sides lose. It is the (credible)
threat rather than the reality of discovery that affects the settlement of cases;
and when there is some discovery, the threat is "more of the same." The
change in the terms of settlements attributable to unnecessary discovery is
invisible to judges and magistrates but is a real diminution in the quality of
justice nonetheless. Data showing that most cases settle without substantial
discovery are not reassuring; the terms of settlement are affected the most
when the parties threaten discovery (explicitly or implicitly) but never use it.
I must define some terms. A normal discovery request is one in which the
demander's costs of pursuing the request (as it sees things) are less than the
increase in the value of the anticipated judgment that the demander expects
the new information to produce. 2 For example, if it costs $1,000 to make
and follow up a demand for information, the stakes of the case are $20,000,
and the requester expects that the information will increase from 60% to 70%
the probability of prevailing, the request is cost-justified from the perspective of the seeker. It costs $1,000 to make but augments the anticipated
judgment by $2,000. Note that the requester ignores the costs its adversary
incurs in fulfilling the demand for information. The discovery rules do not
require the requester to consider these costs, even though the sum of the
parties' costs easily can exceed $2,000. An impositional (excessive, abusive)
discovery request is one "justified" from the demander's perspective not by
its contribution to an anticipated judgment but by its contribution to an
anticipated settlement. If the demand costs $1,000 to make and follow up but
the (anticipated) information would increase the chance of winning $20,000
only from 60%to 61%, the requester sees this as a net loss (spending $1,000
to pursue $200) unless the high costs of producing the information lead the
adverse party to increase its settlement offer by more than $1,000. Stated
differently, an impositional request is one justified by the costs it imposes on

1 Discovery has two other benefits that should be counted in defining a "normal"
request: (1) sharing information increases the extent to which parties agree on the
likely outcome of the case if it goes to trial, which facilitates settlement even if the
parties' costs of pre-trial preparation are held constant; (2) the prospect of obtaining
information through discovery and so enforcing legal rules more accurately leads to
additional compliance with the rules, reducing the number of cases that must be
litigated. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 594 (1989). I
disregard these complications in the text because they do not alter the substance of
the argument.
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one's adversary rather than by the gains to the requester derived from the
contribution the information will make to the accuracy of the judicial process.
Notice that both normal and impositional requests may inflict on the
responding party costs substantially greater than the social value of the
information. 13 They may inflict costs greater than the private value of the
information (the requester who spends $1,000 to pursue $2,000 is making a
normal request even though the producing party must spend $10,000 to
comply with the demand). From the perspective of the producing party,
normal and impositional requests are hard to distinguish-and for the producing party's purposes the difference is immaterial, because they have
identical effects. So both categories may be effectively impositional (that is,
they may yield an increase in the settlement offer out of proportion to the
value of the information in improving accuracy).
Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the
legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves. The
timing is all wrong. The plaintiff files a sketchy complaint (the Rules of Civil
Procedure discourage fulsome documents), and discovery is launched. A
judicial officer does not know the details of the case the parties will present
and in theory cannot know the details. Discovery is used to find the details.
The judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties
themselves may not know very well where they are going or what they
expect to find. A magistrate supervising discovery does not-cannot-know
the expected productivity of a given request, because the nature of the
requester's claim and the contents of the files (or head) of the adverse party
are unknown. Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and benefits to the
requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests. Requesters have no
reason to disclose their own estimates because they gain from imposing
costs on rivals (and may lose from an improvement in accuracy). The
portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on judges to trim back
excessive demands, therefore, have been, and are doomed to be, hollow. 14 We

Subject to the caveat in note 12, supra, the social value is smaller than the value
to the requester alone, because the judgment in the case is simply a transfer payment
between the parties. The social value of litigation lies in its formulation of rules of
conduct and its inducement of compliance with those rules. The prospect of the
transfer payment may lead parties to invest resources greatly exceeding the social
13

value of the case. See Shavell, The Social versus Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a
Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Productionof Information,
1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 361-64.
" Rule 26(g) requires the requester to make only appropriate demands on pain of

sanctions, and Rule 26(c) allows the court to trim back demands for information on
several grounds. Although the need to use this power is sometimes clear, see Powers
v. Chicago Transit Authority, 846 F.2d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1988); Marrese v.
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cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what we cannot
define; we cannot define "abusive" discovery except in theory, because in
practice we lack essential information. Even in retrospect it is hard to label
requests as abusive. How can a judge distinguish a dry hole (common in
litigation as well as in the oil business) from a request that was not justified at
the time? Ex post perspectives are no answer to problems that must be
solved ex ante. It is easy to detect "abuse" if in a securities case the plaintiff
tenders interrogatories asking the defendant whether it was raining when the
prospectus was signed, but this is not a problem in real cases. So it is no
wonder that the magistrates answered "no" when Judge Weinstein asked
them whether there is abuse in the Eastern District of New York. They have
no way to evaluate the costs and benefits of discovery ex ante, and they
rarely examine their handiwork ex post (because the case either settles or
passes to the judge for disposition).
A division of labor in which magistrates handle discovery and judges
handle "the mierits ' is unwise. One common form of unnecessary discovery
(and therefore a ready source of threatened discovery) is delving into ten
issues when one will be dispositive. A magistrate lacks the authority to carve
off the nine unnecessary issues; for all the magistrate knows, the judge may
want evidence on any one of them. So the magistrate stands back and lets
the parties have at it. Pursuit of factual and legal issues that will not matter to
the outcome of the case is a source of enormous unnecessary costs, yet it is
one hard to conquer in a system of notice pleading and even harder to limit
when an officer lacking the power to decide the case supervises discovery.
A modest test: does allocating discovery to magistrates and "the merits"
to judges cut the time needed to litigate a case? In the Eastern District of
New York, the median time between filing and disposition of a civil case is
10 months (with 90% closed in 35 months).1" Cases closed during pretrial
(that is, by settlement, summary judgment, or judgment on the pleadings)
last a median of 17 months (90% within 42 months); cases tried on the merits

last a median of 25 months (90% within 55 months). In the Northern District
of Illinois judges usually supervise discovery. The Northern District of
Illinois is slightly larger than the Eastern District of New York, and its
judges handle more cases apiece of greater complexity (as the Administrative Office of the United States Courts measures such things). Yet the
average time to disposition of a civil case in the Northern District is four
months (90%within 19 months). The median disposition time of a case
closed in pretrial is 12 months (90%within 38 months), and of a case tried to

American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1159-62 (7th Cir. 1984)
(en banc), rev'd in part on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985), it is rarely employed
because of the informational shortfalls discussed in the text.
15 The data here are from Director, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Annual Report 1987, at Table C-5.

HeinOnline -- 69 B.U. L. Rev. 639 1989

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69: 635

judgment 24 months (90% within 68 months). Figures of this kind are subject
to many interpretations, but a simple inference is that judges who handle
discovery bring cases to a faster conclusion than do judges who delegate
discovery to magistrates. No surprise, for a judge can say "Issue X will be
irrelevant, don't pursue it" in a way a magistrate cannot. Yet, records in
cases coming from the Northern District of Illinois are larded with discovery
that was pointless, at least in retrospect. Time and again litigants take
dozens of depositions, only to see the case go off on documents alone. These
depositions are costly in legal time and, frequently, in the time they divert
from the party's ongoing affairs. Engineers and CEOs tied up in discovery
are not contributing to useful products. Deposition costs are not measured
in time and money alone. "[B]eing deposed is scarcely less unpleasant than
being cross-Examined-indeed, often it is more unpleasant, because the
examining lawyer is not inhibited by the presence of a judge or jury who
might resent hectoring tactics. The transcripts of depositions are often very
16
ugly documents."
Supervision by the judge is no panacea, for even the judge who resorts to
all of the tactics in the Manualfor Complex Litigation cannot do much about
the plasticity of legal rules that lie at the heart of modern discoveryboth the need for discovery and the inability to define (and therefore detect
and prevent) impositional discovery. Justice Holmes thought that a developing legal system would subject more and more questions to decision by rule.
Progress lay in the transition from requiring "reasonable" conduct to defining what "reasonableness" consisted of. 1 7 Holmes was a lousy prophet
even if he was right in defining progress. Many complex disputes are governed not by rules but by standards-amorphous agglomerations of "factors" that must be "balanced," usually without any way to reduce the
factors to a common metric or attach weights to them when they conflict, as
they invariably do. Some of these laundry lists stem from the need to resolve
cases in an institution that even in principle cannot yield consistent decisions; the list of factors hides the court's inability to produce a rule.18 Some
of the imprecision arises because judges believe that "considering everything" is a virtue beyond price.19

DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.).
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 111-13, 123-26 (1881).
18 Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 811-30
(1982).
19See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983-86 (1988). But see Trident
Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Kozinski, J.) (pointing out the high social costs of rules requiring courts to consider
everything).
16

17
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Multi-factor standards cut down on loopholes-the bane of rules-but at
great cost. 20 When there is no rule of decision but only an injunction to
consider everything that turns out to matter, lawyers and clients cannot tell
in advance-that is, when planning conduct and conducting litigation-what
the judge or jury will think matters. Lawyers cannot limit their search for
information in discovery, because they do not know what they are looking
for. They do not know when to stop, because they never know when they
have enough. The problem is especially acute when they do not even know
who will be the weighmaster at the scales: the jury is yet to be selected.
When the stakes are high-and often the stakes for corporations are many
times the ad damnum of the complaint 2 t-it is worthwhile to invest the legal
resources needed to produce even a small change in the probable outcome.
Lawyers practicing in good faith, therefore, engage in extensive discovery;
anything less is foolish. When our system of legal rules induces lawyers to
make requests that are extensive but justified, and therefore cannot be called
abusive, it also offers the perfect "cover" for making requests designed only
to impose costs (or to impose costs excessive in relation to the gains). A
judicial officer cannot separate one from the other either ex ante or ex post.
Indeed, many lawyers do not know whether their own discovery requests
are proper or impositional; it is almost impossible to tell one from the other,
and both are in the interests of the lawyer's client. The recipients of discovery requests often cannot see what the requester is getting at, and for
strategic reasons the requester will not tell. So the recipient smells "abuse"
even though he may have diagnosed only his own lack of comprehension.
No wonder there is both a widespread perception that there is a "problem"
with discovery and a belief among those who supervise it, such as the
magistrates in the Eastern District of New York, that the abuse isn't happening in my court.
II
What is to be done? Limiting the number of interrogatories will make no
headway because requests may be subdivided, because a universal limit
(say, 20 in all cases) neglects important differences among kinds of litigation,
and because a requirement that the judge set the "right" number case-bycase runs smack into the informational problem: the parties (likely) and
judge (certainly) do not know the "right" number. If the judge knew the
right amount, discovery could be controlled without the need for devices of
20

See generally Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3

J. LEGAL STUD. 257
21 See Engelmann

(1974).
& Cornell, Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five

Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 398-99 (1988); Jarrell & Peltzman, The Impact
of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 512, 533-36 (1985);
Peltzman, The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 403, 447-48

(1981).
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this character. So too with proposals to penalize the abuse of discovery. The
difficulty is that in a world in which everything is relevant and no one knows
what lies in the adversary's bosom, it is impossible for outsiders accurately
to identify impositional discovery requests, if indeed the lawyers can tell the
difference. What you cannot detect, you cannot single out for sanctions.
Setear's perspective leads him to make some different suggestions. He
proposes, for example, to break the process of discovery into smaller
chunks. This would string out the interactions between counsel. A lawyer
who knows that he needs the cooperation of his adversary in future rounds
will be more reasonable in today's round in order to induce a cooperative
reply tomorrow. There is something to the proposal, although it is subject to
a problem well known in game theory: unraveling. The chain of interactions
is finite. In the last period, someone will defect (fail to cooperate). A,
knowing that his rival B will defect in the last period, sees that there are no
gains from cooperating in the period before last. So A plans to defect in the
penultimate round. B knows that A has this incentive and therefore sees that
there is no gain from cooperating in the second-from-last round; he plans to
defect in that round. A knows that B will reason thus, so he plans to defect in
the third-from-last round, and so on until both parties defect in the very first
round. Whether this occurs depends, as Setear observes, on the discount
rate and on the length of the chain of interactions. Litigation as a rule does
not approach Jarndyce v. Jarndyce; the data produced above show that in
federal courts the bulk of cases is resolved in less than a year. Discounting
the losses from future defections therefore is unlikely to produce cooperation today. Only a dramatic increase in the duration of litigation-objectionable on independent grounds-would make staged discovery a powerful
motive for cooperation.
Several of Setear's other suggestions are less attractive still. He says, for
example, that large law firms contribute to the problem by reducing the
number of interactions among lawyers, implying that a program of reducing
the size of firms would help curtail discovery abuse. The argument is flawed.
The number of interactions between one lawyer and any other falls as the
size of the bar grows, not as the size of law firms grows. Larger firms create
sustained interactions that otherwise would not exist. A lawyer at Firm C
contemplating serving an impositional discovery request on a lawyer represented by Firm D must contemplate the possibility that the retaliation will
come not from the lawyer opposing him in today's case but from some other
lawyer in Firm D, in some other case in which Firm C is involved. Firms are
like extended families, and systems of primitive law usually relied on the
victim's family to exact retribution (and so deter misconduct). In the limit, a
large city with only two law firms could be as convivial as a small town with
only two lawyers. That limit is never reached; some law firms' internal
affairs are run in the same cutthroat manner as their litigation. Still, to the
extent firms act as entities, size ameliorates the discovery problem.
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I am similarly unpersuaded by Setear's implication that we need special
rules to protect small litigants from the large ones. Impositional discovery
requests depend on asymmetric costs. If E's demands injure F more than F's
demands can injure E, then E has every reason to pepper its adversary with
requests. Large litigants have files-warehouses full of files. The adversary
can demand that they be searched, at great cost; the adversary can notice the
depositions of 20 corporate officers. What can the large litigant do to retaliate? Sure big firms fight tooth and nail, for they stand to lose more than
their smaller adversaries stand to win. Large firms are repeat players. Losing
has a precedential effect. A judgment that an auto has been designed defectively, or that a clause in an insurance contract covers a given risk, will cost
the manufacturer or insurer much more in future cases than the plaintiff
gains in today's. To prevent such consequences large firms will use many
weapons, including discovery. But in a fight between the big and the small,
the big are more likely to be the targets of impositional discovery requests; in
a fight between the rich and the poor, money flows in one direction only, no
22
matter who is in the right.
III
Setear offers only palliatives. No remedy directed at impositional discovery requests could be more than a palliative. For excessive discovery is only
a symptom of larger problems-the inability of our legal system to define
what is relevant to a legal conflict and to make the parties bear the costs of
their own endeavors. Relief comes from dealing with the causes. Lawyers
respond to the incentives the legal system gives them. Change these incentives, and you change lawyers' conduct. Leave the D alone, and efforts to
deal with their consequences are doomed.
The principal facilitators of impositional discovery requests are rules
(standards, really) that make everything relevant and nothing dispositive.
Such approaches engender endless search for ... well, for something that
may tuin out to be useful, once lawyers learn what the tribunal thinks
important. If we want to cope with the "problem" of discovery, we must do
away with multi-factor standards, replacing them with rules that call for
inquiry into a limited number of objectively ascertainable facts. Courts are
beginning to do this. The Supreme Court recognized that its approach to
official immunity led to endless rummaging, undercutting many of the goals
of immunity doctrines. It responded by simplifying the rules and making
cases turn on objective evidence.2 3 The Court has simplified much of antitrust law in a way that will cut down the need to seek evidence and therefore
Easterbrook, Justice and Contractin Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Cml. LEGAL
F. 19, 28-29.
23 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987).
22
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the ability to conceal impositional discovery requests under the cover of
searching for the needle in the haystack. 4
Legal uncertainty is the godfather of discovery abuse. Uncertainty comes
not only from nebulous rules in traditional subjects such as torts and contracts but also from attempting to handle in the courts, problems amenable to
no simple solution. Asbestos litigation, attempts to reform institutions, and
the like create problems because it is hard to see even in principle how a
court can resolve them. Then there is the prospect (and reality) of legal
change. George Priest has documented the effects of actual legal change on
the costs of litigation .25 Anticipated change has additional effects. A litigant
fearing that the rules in force today will not apply by the time the case comes
to judgment has little alternative but to cast a wider net in discovery, seeking
evidence that may be pertinent under whatever rule should apply. Such
requests look for all the world like impositional discovery requests, but are
not. Yet they impose the same costs as do impositional requests, and to the
recipients they are identical. They breed retaliatory requests. By most
accounts, the pace of legal change (legislative and judicial) has never been
greater. We cannot logically condemn litigants' rational reactions; we cannot
do anything about impositional requests that masquerade as proper ones,
and we have made it impossible to tell the two apart.
"Impossible" is an overstatement. It is impossible only when the parties
are in charge of a system characterized by notice pleading. Impossible, in
other words, when discovery precedes the identification of the dispositive
legal issues. If pleadings were used to focus legal and factual disputes before
discovery began, or if discovery alternated with legal resolution, constantly
paring away issues, the process would be more tolerable.2 6 Civil law systems
do this, and so do many common law systems. A judicial officer (a term that
glosses over the difference between "magistrates" and "judges" in our
system, and among the kinds of judge in Europe) could decide when discovery is necessary, of what and from whom. Once the officer decides what is
likely to make a difference to the outcome, it is easy to decide what ought to
be acquired in discovery. If the case is unresolved after the judge applies the

For example, the Court sustained a grant of summary judgment in Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1986), by devising a
24

test that made the mountainous record that had been assembled in the case all but
irrelevant. The new approach, requiring the parties to compile only a few readily
available facts, will streamline the discovery process in future cases and enable
courts to cut off impositional requests by deciding the case on the merits.
25

Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193 (1987); see also

Cooter, Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal
Change", 3 J.L. ECON. &

ORG.

227 (1987).

Changing Rule 26(b)(1) to limit discovery to matters admissible at trial would be
a logical counterpart to a process linking discovery to the resolution of questions
identified with specificity.
26
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law to what is discovered in response to this request, the officer ascertains
the next appropriate inquiry and directs discovery concerning it. This reverses in two ways the approach now used in the United States: it puts some
preliminary assessment of the merits ahead of the decision about discovery,
and it puts the judicial officer rather than counsel in charge. Litigants in
nations that employ this system do not complain about abusive discovery; to
the contrary, they like their process and complain when portions of our
system (which they think barbaric) begin to intrude. The judicial officer does
not make impositional demands, and the link of discovery to the merits
greatly cuts down on the number of demands made for any purpose.
Perhaps a system in which judges pare away issues and focus investigation
is too radical to contemplate in this country-although it prevailed here
before 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. The
change could not be accomplished without abandoning notice pleading,
increasing the number of judicial officers, and giving them more authority
(the system depends on the presiding officer having the power to decide). If
we are to rule out judge-directed discovery, however, we must be prepared
to pay the piper. Part of the price is the high cost of unnecessary
discovery-impositional and otherwise.
If neither a simple and stable legal system nor one run by inquiring
magistrates is attainable in the United States, then only one change holds
significant prospect of curtailing impositional discovery. Impositional discovery depends on asymmetric stakes: the requester incurs lower costs than
the person interrogated. The requester saddles its adversary with these costs
to improve its bargaining position. We could do what almost every other
civilized legal system does and deny the abuser the fruits, requiring it to pay
the costs it has imposed. This does not mean "sanctions"; when legitimate
and impositional requests look alike, the threat of sanctions is hollow. Only
an automatic reversal of costs is likely to do the trick. The party always
knows better than the judge which requests are legitimate and which are
impositional. Even fee-shifting leaves opportunities-for legal costs are only
a portion of the full costs of taking employees of a corporation out of work
and holding them captive in lawyers' offices during depositions. But requiring the loser to pay the winner's legal fees and costs would do a great deal to
cut off the attractiveness of unnecessary discovery requests.
Loser-pays is only one of many ways to require those who want discovery
to pay for the privilege. We could require the demander to pay the costs of
discovery on the spot, as we now require payment when one side wants to
depose the other's expert witness.2 7 If the person making the demand prevails (and the court concludes that the discovery contributed to the outcome,
an essential qualification), he would recover the costs at the end of the case.
Such an approach, and its variants, still requires an assessment of what was
necessary. Professor E. Donald Elliott suggested at this conference a variant
27
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of the loser-pays rule based on Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under Rule 68 either side may make an offer of judgment. If the
adversary turns down the offer and then does worse at trial, we learn that the
additional proceedings were unnecessary. The "loser" (you can lose by
doing less well than you could have done) must bear its own costs and fees
incurred after the offer, even if it otherwise would be entitled to recover
them. 21 Professor Elliott's variant is that after the commencement of the
litigation, each side may tender to the other all documents (and other
evidence) it believes is relevant to the case. A litigant believing that information has been withheld may obtain compulsory discovery, but if it loses, must
pay fully for the privilege. This ingenious proposal induces litigants to reveal
their theories so that their adversaries' disclosures are adequate; it induces
everyone to make a core of information available quickly and cheaply; and it
discourages impositional and otherwise-unnecessary requests. All of this is
accomplished without a full commitment to the loser-pays rule.
A proposal to require losers to pay winners' fees and costs-even one so
modest as Professor Elliott's-invariably induces the rejoinder: That would
freeze poor persons and those of modest resources out of court! Not likely;
the poor routinely are excused from paying costs now, and such an exception would apply to any loser-pays system. The threat of taking from those
who have nothing is not serious. Those of modest means rarely participate in
the kinds of cases in which there is voluminous discovery even under current
rules. More, the bar-which through the contingent fee device offers representation to many who could not pay hourly rates-readily could organize
a pool to spread the risk of unsuccessful ventures and cover the costs from
successful ones. Many class actions are "syndicated" among the bar for just
this reason, and law firms also have pooling characteristics. No matter how
efficacious these private responses may be, we cannot allow the legal system
to be held hostage to concerns that affect a small fraction of litigants.
Impositional discovery is practiced in big-stakes cases between substantial
litigants, represented by the most costly legal talent. This problem should be
tackled, with the difficulties of impoverished and middle-class litigants
carved off for different treatment if need be.
Now the loser-pays system does not simply discourage pointless expense
(by requiring it to be borne by the party making the demand), it also reduces
the cost of litigation by those who believe that they are more likely than not
to prevail. This has the advantage of selectively encouraging the filing and
prosecution of meritorious cases .29 It has the disadvantage of inducing those
See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985); see also Miller, An Economic
Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 93 (1986); Priest, Regulating the Content
and Volume of Litigation:An Economic Analysis, 1 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 163, 164
(1982).
29 Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 71-73 (1982).
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who believe they have a meritorious case to spend more on litigation, other
things being equal.3 0 The party that is sure to prevail believes that its tab will
be picked up by the other side; with the cost of litigation services now zero,
it will splurge. No one thinks the probability of prevailing (and collecting
every cent) is 100%; but when the party thinks that the probability exceeds
50% and believes that each side's costs and fees are equal, the loser-pays
rule reduces the costs this litigant perceives it incurs by pressing ahead. If
the parties agree on the likely outcome (for example, plaintiff and defendant
agree that the plaintiff's chance of winning is 60%) it will be easy to settle the
case; if each party is optimistic, however, the loser-pays rule may increase
the investment in discovery. This is not to say, however, that it aggravates
the discovery "problem." The paradigm impositional discovery request
comes from a party thinking it has a relatively small chance of prevailing
(say, 5% to 10%, a measure of background legal uncertainty) but wanting to
convey the message: "This suit will cost you $1 million whether I win or not;
we can split that in settlement." Such tactics are unambiguously discouraged by a loser-pays rule. The target of this request has only to say no, and
the demand will stand revealed as a bluff. 31 So too with requests by litigants
whose claims are more solid (beyond the strike-suit range), but still less than
50%. Discovery "abuse" rarely is attributed to the party in the right-the
one with the greater chance of prevailing at trial. If the party entitled to
prevail makes an impositional demand, the adversary can save the cost by
capitulating, which it should do anyway given the assumption that it is going
to lose the case. The loser-pays rule, therefore, is likely to discourage exactly
the kind of demand that should be discouraged, while being neutral toward
(even encouraging) discovery by parties with superior legal claims.
IV
The source of "discovery abuse" does not lie in the rules regulating
discovery. It cannot be fixed by tinkering with Rule 26, Rule 37, or any of
their companions. Moving supervision from judges to magistrates, or magistrates to judges, will not help much; neither can detect problematic requests,

30 Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really
Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 144-45 (1987).
1 Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance

Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (demonstrating that asymmetric costs of

litigation, a consequence of the legal system's failure to shift costs, is the source of
leverage employed by litigants who maintain positions that are unlikely to prevail if
evaluated on the merits); see also Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement
Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 448 (1988) (discussing how uncertainty about the
decision to go to trial contributes to the phenomenon-an uncertainty that would not
be material if costs were allocated to losing parties).
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so that neither supervision nor sanctions will make a dent in the problem.
The source lies elsewhere-in the structure of legal rules (too much uncertainty), in the allocation of fees and costs (they should be borne by those
who cause them to be incurred), and in the operation of the judicial system
(there is room for more direction by judicial officers and less by litigants).
Unless our legal culture is prepared to address the causes of discovery
abuse, it should not caterwaul about the symptoms.
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